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Rising
Prescription
Drug Costs:
What Is Involved and
What Can Be Done?
by James Carroll
The rapid rise of prescription drug costs in the United
States has triggered heated debate at the federal and state
levels about how to control costs and expand access for
those in need. In part, the United States finds itself in 
this situation because, unlike most countries throughout the
world, the federal government, thus far, has refused to 
exact federal price restrictions on pharmaceutical products. 
James Carroll argues that this has left each state in the 
difficult position of trying to leverage lower costs and
expanded access for its citizens. In this article, Carroll
provides an overview of these attempts, including the 
Maine Rx program and the more recent legislation passed
by Maine’s 121st legislature. He concludes with an analysis
of how effective such programs are likely to be in the long
run, particularly if the federal government continues to 
abdicate on its responsibility to address the issue in 
comprehensive fashion.  
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INTRODUCTION
The explosive growth in both the use and costs of pharmaceutical products over the past 20 years 
is a major cause for public concern. The United States
stands almost alone among countries in not having
federal-level price restrictions on pharmaceuticals. 
Over time, the relationship between the pharmaceutical
industry and government, at both the federal and state
levels, has changed dramatically. In the past 30 years,
the federal government’s role has shifted from serving
primarily as a regulatory body, providing guidance on
what and how pharmaceutical products could be sold,
toward acting as the largest purchaser of pharmaceutical
products. Recently, the lack of meaningful federal price
regulations is leading to a transformation in the relation-
ship between state governments and the pharmaceutical
industry, as states on their own increasingly attempt to
do what the federal government has not—to control
pharmaceutical costs and to expand consumer access.
Explanations for the greatly increased spending on
pharmaceutical products since the 1980s are complex.
The key reasons include: cost-increase issues (especially
monopoly pricing for pharmaceuticals under patent,
and increased costs for new products that have been
developed), and issues related to increased volume of usage
of pharmaceutical products (especially the change from
treating acute diseases to chronic diseases and the tran-
sition of people from older products to newer ones).
The trend toward increased spending for prescription
drugs has combined with a movement to shift
Medicaid costs toward state governments. This combi-
nation has heightened the focus on the financial burden
states face for pharmaceutical products. For example,
Figure 1 shows the increasing costs for prescription
drug coverage under the state’s MaineCare program.
On the individual level, the costs of pharmaceutical
products have become so prohibitive, they are not a
viable option for most citizens without insurance plans
that provide some coverage for prescription drugs.
Some spending-increase factors are largely beyond
the scope of either federal or state governments to
readily control. Others, however, are receiving attention
by federal and state governments as they attempt to
limit cost escalation and to improve citizens’ access to
prescription medications. The means by which the
states and federal government are pursuing this agenda
are somewhat varied, but clearly a number of states are
acting as the policy laboratories. Maine is acknowl-
edged as one of the leaders in seeking and developing
new approaches to prescription drug policy questions. 
This paper is designed to provide an overview 
and broad analysis of some of the policy ideas being
proposed or implemented at the state level, both across
the nation and in Maine, to deal with prescription drug
costs. This paper also will provide a brief overview of
the pharmaceutical industry and a discussion about some
of the market forces that are being exploited for possible
cost savings in the more recent legislation. Of particular
interest is the emerging shift from a focus on direct cost
reduction toward regulating the market in ways that
change market behavior, and, as a result, lower costs.
THE GROWING IMPORTANCE 
OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS
In an earlier article in Maine Policy Review, Dora Anne Mills documented the transition from a focus 
on treating infectious diseases to the current focus on
treating chronic disease (2000). That transition, which
FIGURE 1: Change in Cost of Prescription Drugs in Maine,
1997-2002
Source: Maine Department of Human Services, Bureau of Medical
Services.“Annual Report to the State Legislature for MaineCare.”
(2002): 8
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is discussed less frequently than
the other causes for the high
cost of prescription drugs, has
substantially supported the
explosive growth in pharmaceu-
tical product use and costs.
During the 1980s and
1990s, the pharmaceutical
industry developed and
launched products that provide
the ability to treat people with
many symptoms associated with
chronic diseases. For example,
products known as beta-
blockers and ace-inhibitors
provided the first highly 
effective means to treat hyper-
tension. There is substantial
evidence that over the past 15
years, products such as these
have contributed significantly 
to a higher quality of life for
millions of people. However,
taking medications for chronic
disease for many people requires a lifelong consump-
tion of these products to maintain that quality of life.
For some products such as the ace-inhibitors, there are
claims and some evidence that the cost of the medica-
tion is actually lower than the costs that would have
been experienced without the medication, due to what
would have been an increase in hospital use and critical
care. However, such studies can be notoriously difficult
to assess since they frequently discuss treatment costs as
though end-of-life care and deaths were actually
avoided, which is clearly not realistic. It is more accu-
rate to note that the medications can delay the substan-
tial costs related to end-of-life care and treatment. 
Ultimately, the negative side of the dramatic
growth in pharmaceutical use has been the increased
costs for the payers: consumers, insurance companies,
and the government. The positive side is two-fold: 
(1) millions of people have improved health and well-
being, and (2) the pharmaceutical industry has been
one of the most successful sectors of the United States
economy over the past 20 years.
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND 
ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH GOVERNMENT
Slowing the rapid growth of prescription drug costshas become a crucial policy issue facing all sectors 
of the United States health care system, including insur-
ance companies, providers, consumers, and state and
federal governments. In order to evaluate and implement
various policy alternatives, it is important to have some
understanding both of the role of the federal govern-
ment vis a` vis the pharmaceutical industry and of the
way the pharmaceutical industry itself operates. 
Role of the Federal Government
Historically, the federal government was involved
in regulating the pharmaceutical industry to ensure
safety via the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
From the 1960s through the 1980s, the federal role in
the overall health care system began to change, largely
because of the creation of Medicare and Medicaid.
The establishment of these programs led the federal
government to become the single largest purchaser of
health care in the United States. When Medicare was
initially implemented, pharmaceutical costs were not
substantial compared to the cost of hospitalization.
There also were disagreements between industry lobby-
ists and lawmakers on the importance of including a
pharmaceutical benefit in the program. Therefore, a
prescription drug benefit was not included in Medicare. 
During this period, the government retained a role 
that was focused on regulation and encouragement 
of the growth of the pharmaceutical industry. 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the federal
government began experiencing substantial costs for
pharmaceutical products, through the Medicare hospital
pharmaceutical benefit and the Medicaid and Veterans
Administration programs in particular. It has reached the
level where pharmaceutical costs are a substantial part of
the government’s health care costs. With the emergence
of cost as an issue for the federal government, a change
in the federal government’s relationship to the pharma-
ceutical companies began to emerge in the 1990s. From
being a pharmaceutical industry regulator, the federal
government increasingly became a purchaser, similar to
its role in relation to other health care providers.
The changing focus 
of federal policy for
pharmaceuticals and
the emergence of
state-by-state legisla-
tion aimed at limiting
pharmaceutical costs
have huge implica-
tions with regard 
to regulating the
behavior of pharma-
ceutical companies.
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Achieving a balance between managing spending
and encouraging economic growth and public health
continues to hamper the development of a Medicare
prescription drug benefit. Trying to strike this balance
seems to have essentially paralyzed the federal govern-
ment in developing legislation that clearly delineates
the pharmaceutical market and the role of the govern-
ment as a purchaser. It is important to keep in mind
that the federal government, because of its size as a
purchaser and its simultaneous role as the key regulator
of industry, has a unique leverage when setting policy
in dealing with the pharmaceutical industry. However,
unlike most countries throughout the world, the United
States government has not used this leverage to exact
price restrictions on pharmaceuticals.
State governments are not in a position to provide
the kind of encompassing answer to the question of
improved access and cost containment that the federal
government could impose, nor do state governments
have the leverage in imposing laws that the federal
government has. However, with the lack of any direc-
tion emerging from the federal government to deal
with the costs and access issues that have emerged, 
state governments have begun developing policies that
try to manage costs in their own states. Because the
vast majority of states do not feel any substantial
economic benefit from the boom of the pharmaceutical
industry, they have fewer incentives than the federal
government to protect the industry, and thus are
perhaps more willing to attempt policy alternatives 
the federal government has hesitated to propose. 
The changing focus of federal policy for pharma-
ceuticals and the emergence of state-by-state legislation
aimed at limiting pharmaceutical costs have huge 
implications with regard to regulating the behavior 
of pharmaceutical companies. As more market-based
legislation is introduced at the state level, it is useful 
to understand how the pharmaceutical industry 
actually functions.
Overview of the Pharmaceutical Industry
The perception and reality of what pharmaceu-
tical companies do has evolved substantially over the
past 20 years. In the past, the large pharmaceutical
companies focused on doing research to develop useful
and occasionally dramatic new products. Indeed, 
this is the image that the trade association, PhRMA
(Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
Association), continues to promote. However,
marketing has now gained increased importance 
in the pharmaceutical industry. Indeed, consumer
advocacy lobbying groups such as Families USA 
and Public Citizen expend a substantial effort to point
out that the PhRMA companies spend more money
marketing their products than they do on researching
and developing new products. 
The debate about how PhRMA companies divide
their investments between marketing on the one hand
or research and development on the other should 
be simple. However, the numbers that are used in the
debate can be elusive. A substantial portion of all
product development is now actually done outside 
of the PhRMA companies. Almost an entire industry
exists of small research-based companies focused on
the earliest phases of pharmaceutical product develop-
ment. As an estimate, nearly 50% of all pharmaceutical
research is now done outside of the PhRMA compa-
nies. However, the PhRMA companies, through a wide
variety of investments, ultimately pay for much of the
successful research. Because of this evolution in the
way the industry operates, obtaining a simple number
of how much the large companies invest in research
can be difficult. This leads to the wide variations that
can be seen in the numbers quoted by Families USA,
which tries to minimize the amount that these compa-
nies spend on research, as opposed to the numbers
quoted on the PhRMA Web site, which tries to maxi-
mize the amount that companies spend on research.
Similarly, clearly identifying how much money is 
spent on marketing can be difficult, since a substantial
portion of what Public Citizen would call “marketing,”
PhRMA might call “physician education.” 
It is clear that the importance of marketing for
pharmaceutical products has grown dramatically over
the past decade. Perhaps a simple way to observe this
growth is to examine the number of people in the
United States who now have a job “detailing” pharma-
ceutical products for prescribers. Detailing is essentially
visiting prescribers, dropping off samples of various
branded products, and seeking an opportunity to
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explain the clinical benefits of the two or three prod-
ucts the detail representative is marketing. In the early
1990s, there were nearly 40,000 people detailing
pharmaceutical products; today, there are over 100,000
people. It is safe to assume that the number of
researchers within PhRMA companies has not
witnessed a similar increase of at least 250% over the
past decade. 
Marketing pharmaceutical products is something
that is done almost completely within the PhRMA
companies. Large companies have shifted from an
internal focus on research to an internal focus on
marketing in support of combined internal and
external research. This shift in strategy has had a huge
impact on both the perception and the reality of these
companies. It seems undeniable that the PhRMA
companies are probably the most competent product-
marketing group in the world, especially in regard to
technical marketing. That knowledge and focus has
coincided with PhRMA becoming recognized as the
single most important and effective governmental
lobbying body in the United States. As has been noted
by Public Citizen and other groups, PhRMA retains
more lobbyists than there are members of Congress. 
One area that has emerged as a substantial issue
for PhRMA companies is understanding and managing
the relationship between the industry and the federal
government as the government has changed from regu-
lator to purchaser of pharmaceutical products. While
PhRMA’s lobbying effort is highly successful, it has
also needed to develop an optimal working relationship
with the government as a customer. An example of the
problems the customer/lobbying relationship has
caused is Medicare’s pricing of products. The federal
government is supposed to be guaranteed a reduced
rate relative to all other purchasers of pharmaceutical
products in the United States. The separate federal
programs, Veterans Administration, Medicare and
Medicaid, each negotiate separately for pharmaceutical
discounts. The mechanisms to ensure this, however,
have some clear problems. The central problem is that 
it is very difficult to ascertain the exact price any one
person or group is paying for a specific pharmaceutical
product. The industry standard pricing, known as the
average wholesale price (AWP), is readily acknowledged
to be a poor standard since it does not include any
discounts or rebates that specific purchasers, such as the
government or any large purchaser, receive. Due to the
failure to acknowledge those rebates in the pricing
charged to the Medicare and Medicaid programs, the
federal government filed charges of overcharging
against essentially all major pharmaceutical companies
in the late 1990s. To date, none of these suits has gone
to court, but there have been some substantial out-of-
court settlements, with payment from companies
including Bayer and GlaxoSmithkline making restitu-
tion to the federal government.
The real problem that worries PhRMA companies
in having the federal government as a key customer is
that the government could impose true price controls,
as opposed to the negotiated price discounts that
currently exist. In almost every other country in the
world, the federal government does in fact impose price
restrictions for all products for which the government
provides coverage. In the United States, the Medicare
system has imposed price controls on reimbursement
for other aspects of provider care. If a federal prescrip-
tion coverage plan is implemented, PhRMA, probably
reasonably, expects that over time, as prices increase,
that the federal government would impose price restric-
tions. Because Americans pay the highest prescription
drug prices in the world, the United States accounts 
for a wildly disproportionate amount of the worldwide
revenue for pharmaceutical products, almost 40% of
total revenue worldwide. Therefore, any kind of price
controls, even if limited to federally funded programs
such as Medicare, would severely impact on pharma-
ceutical company revenues and profits.
In trying to understand the pharmaceutical
industry, the vast majority of effort is expended on
considering marketing and research costs. An alternate
way to think about the pharmaceutical industry is to
try to understand the pharmaceutical marketplace,
specifically the exchange of payment for goods
received. Looking at this “flow” of goods and payments
can suggest points at which policy efforts might be
directed and help us to assess the feasibility of
proposed policy alternatives. 
Figure 2 shows the flow of goods going from the
manufacturer to the consumer in dark blue, the flow of
money in light blue, and the marketing of pharmaceu-
tical products in dashed blue. A key point is that the
decision to prescribe a pharmaceutical product does not
begin with the consumer, but rather comes from the
physician. This explains why 90% of pharmaceutical
marketing is directed toward physicians not consumers.
A second key feature of Figure 2 is the difficulty in
clearly tracking how the money for prescription drugs
moves from the consumer or insurer to the pharmaceu-
tical company. The disconnection between the flow 
of goods, cash, and marketing effort is at the heart 
of the complexity of the pharmaceutical marketplace. 
Pharmaceutical Benefit Managers (PBMs) play an
increasingly important role in the pharmaceutical cost
“picture.” As I shall discuss, a number of state-level 
policy initiatives relate to PBMs. Pharmaceutical Benefit
Managers administer the prescription drug part of health
insurance plans on behalf of plan sponsors, such as 
self-insured employers, insurance companies, and HMOs.
These organizations negotiate with drug manufacturers
to obtain rebates for a plan sponsor and with retail 
pharmacies to obtain discounts on prescription drug
prices and dispensing fees for health plan enrollees. 
In exchange for these services, a PBM may receive a
percentage of manufacturer rebates or a fee per prescrip-
tion. Ideally, some part of the rebate is used to reduce
the cost of the prescription drugs to consumers. A PBM
typically tries to achieve high-quality care at the lowest
possible cost by formulary development. (A formulary is 
a list of prescription drugs, grouped by therapeutic class,
that are preferred by a health plan sponsor.) Drugs are
included on a formulary, both for reasons of medical
value and on the basis of price. Pharmaceutical Benefit
Managers often will provide physicians and others with
printed formularies that identify drugs according to their
relative cost within a therapeutic class. 
FIGURE 2: Flow of Goods, Cash, and Advertising for Pharmaceuticals
Insurer                         Employer
Cash
Goods
Advertising 
Physician
Pharmaceutical 
Benefit Manager 
(PBM)
DECISION TO PRESCRIBE
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STATE-LEVEL POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
Anumber of proposals for prescription drug policieshave been developed and implemented by various
state legislatures.1 In developing policy, most states have
focused attention on three areas: (1) reducing 
costs to people who cannot afford the products, 
(2) managing the costs that states pay directly via
Medicaid coverage (states are responsible for approxi-
mately 33% of the payments), and (3) increasing access
to pharmaceutical products.
Direct Cost-reduction Strategies
Thirty-four states have proposed or enacted legis-
lation in an effort to reduce consumer costs as a way 
to increase access to pharmaceuticals. These plans can
be classified into eight relatively distinct strategies.
These strategies have different implications in terms 
TABLE 1: An Overview of Direct Cost-reduction Strategies
PLAN MECHANISM FOR CONSUMER FUNDING SOURCE
(state examples) PROVIDING DISCOUNT SAVINGS
Discount for uninsured
via Medicaid discount
(e.g. ME, HI,VT)
Pharmacy discount
(e.g.,AZ, CA, IA)
Use assistance plans
(e.g., MD, OR,TX)
Aggregate purchasing
plans
(e.g.,AR, OR,VT)
State-run Medicaid Rx
plans
(e.g., IL)
Rebates for people
suffering specific illness
(e.g.TX, NC)
Reimbursement
Tax credit
(e.g., MI, MO)
Provide a pharmaceutical discount program for
any state residents who meet some income
eligibility level, where the discount is tied to the
discount the state already receives for Medicaid
prescriptions (e.g., Maine Rx)
Price is negotiated by the state; people have to
meet eligibility requirements; most states
require a specific up-front fee to join the
program
Verify that all possible residents are taking
advantage of pharmaceutical assistance plans
(which sometimes offer free prescriptions)
offered from various pharmaceutical companies
Join groups within the state, or combine with
other states to increase negotiating leverage
(e.g.,Vermont, Michigan and Washington have
combined as a group)
Provide a state-run and state-supported
prescription drug benefit through the Medicaid
program for those below an income threshold
who are on Medicaid
Drug rebates for people suffering from specific
illness (e.g.,Texas has a program for drugs
purchased by the Kidney Health Care program)
Reimburse some percentage of costs for
people who meet eligibility and can document
their costs (e.g., Indiana explored, and changed
to direct benefit)
Reimburse some percentage of prescription
costs via a state tax credit for prescription drug
costs for people who meet eligibility criteria
Immediate
Immediate
Immediate
Immediate
Immediate
Immediate
Delayed
Delayed
Pharmaceutical industry
Pharmaceutical industry
Pharmaceutical industry
Pharmaceutical industry
State
State
State
State
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of their impacts on consumers and in terms of their
funding sources. In terms of consumer impact, cost
reductions may be immediate or delayed. Funding
sources may be the state or the pharmaceutical industry.
Examining consumer impact and funding sources
highlights some of the potential benefits of these plans
as well as the potential difficulties. Benefits are more
apparent when considered from the consumer’s
perspective; problems are more apparent when the
funding source is considered. From the consumer’s
perspective, the benefit is obviously better if the cost
saving is immediate. A delayed rebate will not facilitate
obtaining access to a prescription if it is initially cost-
prohibitive. Table 1 outlines the mechanisms involved
in various cost-reduction strategies that have been
implemented or proposed, and shows the impact on
consumer savings, as well as the funding source for
each type of plan. Several of the plans described here
TABLE 2: Benefits and Challenges of Direct Cost-reduction Strategies
PLAN BENEFITS CHALLENGES 
Discount for uninsured via
Medicaid discount
Pharmacy discount
Use assistance plans
Aggregate purchasing plans
State-run Medicaid Rx plans
Rebates for people suffering
specific illness
Reimbursement
Tax Credit
• Reduces costs for the most 
disadvantaged population
• Requires relatively little state funding
• Simple to implement
• Provides immediate cost reduction
for a large population
• Limited to zero cost for state
• Tends to serve a high need 
population
• Provides a savings to the state and to
consumers, so politically easy to sell
• Provides broadest protection for
state Medicaid recipients
• Easy to implement
• Limited cost exposure
• Conceptually simple
• Clearly benefits those paying the
most for pharmaceutical products
• Allows uninsured to be protected
• Conceptually simple
• Clearly benefits those paying the
most for pharmaceutical products
• Allows uninsured to be protected
• Legality of the plan is in question 
• Fairly complicated to explain
• Could create cost demand from
pharmacies rather than manufac-
turers
• Criteria for acceptance in these 
plans can be quite limited
• Inherent limits in the size and 
scope of these plans
• Provides a savings only to people
covered by state plans
• Highest cost exposure for the state
of all plans
• Very narrow population served
• Creates paperwork challenge 
for some people
• Consumer has to pay money 
up front prior to reimbursement
• Direct cost for state
• Will be most difficult for most 
needy population 
• Creates paperwork challenge 
for some people
• Consumer has to pay money 
up front prior to reimbursement
• Direct cost for state
• Will be most difficult for most 
needy population
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are designed to improve access to pharmaceutical bene-
fits for all eligible groups, including previously uncov-
ered populations, as well as to reduce costs. Table 2
summarizes the plans in terms of their benefits and the
challenges involved in implementing them.
The difficulties in implementing the plans are more
apparent when the funding source is considered. Given
the current, broad crisis in state funding, programs that
require state funds to provide a consumer discount are
facing enormous difficulties. At the same time, the phar-
maceutical industry has worked to minimize the ability
of states to enact legislation that forces pharmaceutical
company discounts to be passed on to consumers. 
After almost a decade of legislative attempts to
provide direct cost reductions to consumers, there
appear to be fewer new strategies being undertaken by
state legislatures throughout the country. Rather, those
states that were slow to initiate policies providing direct
cost reduction are now trying to identify the strategies
from the list in Table 2 with the best benefit/cost
profile. Among these plans, the aggregate purchasing
idea appears to be developing a broader appeal as a
way to force pharmaceutical companies to negotiate
larger discounts for states.
The Maine Rx-type program, in particular, has
received broad attention as a novel means to lower costs
for a large number of people. The Maine Rx program
was developed as a way for Maine to use its leverage to
negotiate lower prices to benefit uninsured people. The
truly novel part of the Maine Rx program is its effort to
lower prescription costs for people who do not directly
receive any government-sponsored benefit. The pharma-
ceutical industry, through PhRMA, sued to halt imple-
mentation of the Maine Rx plan. A May 2003 ruling 
by the U.S. Supreme Court has now said that drug
makers did not adequately show why Maine's plan
should be blocked.  Although further legal challenges 
are anticipated, Maine now intends to proceed with
implementation. Even before the Supreme Court ruling
on the constitutionality of the Maine Rx program,
similar programs were enacted in Vermont and Hawaii,
and these will presumably go forward now as well.
Details of the Maine Rx program are shown in Table 3.2 
Market-based State Legislation
States that have been pioneers in pursuing direct
cost-reduction strategies now appear to be changing
their focus to promote market-based reforms that 
could result in the lowering of costs by pharmaceutical
companies for all consumers.3 Market-based reforms
include strategies such as counter-detailing and
increased marketing disclosure. The idea supporting
these approaches is that by creating a more competitive
marketplace, costs can be decreased for consumers and
the states. A basic tenet of a competitive marketplace 
is that good comparative information is readily available
to consumers. However, for pharmaceuticals that is 
not usually the case. Even physicians, who are the true
decisionmakers regarding prescriptions, do not have
complete information regarding pharmaceuticals. A
recent study noted that less than 50% of physicians 
are aware of the actual costs of pharmaceutical prod-
ucts (Korn et al. 2003). Therefore, it seems reasonable
TABLE 3: The Maine Rx Program in Brief
1. Any Maine resident may enroll in the Maine Rx program
and receive a Maine Rx card. However, only those
consumers who lack prescription drug insurance stand 
to benefit from the discounts provided by the program.
2. Persons who enroll in the program receive discounts 
for their prescription drugs if the state has negotiated a
rebate with the manufacturer of that prescription drug.
3. Persons enrolled in the program pay the pharmacist 
the reduced price for the drug.
4. The pharmacist is paid by the state the amount of the
discount plus an administrative fee.The state receives
from the drug manufacturer the amount of the discount 
in the form of a rebate.
5. The program uses the market power of Maine’s Medicaid
program to bring prescription drug manufacturers to the
table to negotiate rebates. If a manufacturer does not
provide a rebate, that manufacturer’s products may be
placed on the Maine Medicaid program’s list of drugs
requiring prior authorization by Medicaid for payment.
6. The Maine Rx program requires the state to use its best
efforts to obtain rebates from manufacturers equal to or
greater than the rebates received by the Medicaid program.
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that increasing the level and quality of information 
that physicians have would enable them to prescribe
more cost-effective products. 
For example, the core idea of counter-detailing is
to make physicians aware of generic prescribing
options in a similar fashion to the way brand-
prescribing options are already communicated. If there
were to be direct detailing of generic options, the hope
is that physicians would prescribe generic products
more frequently than they now do. This goes beyond
the common and relatively simple measure ensuring
that if a generic equivalent exists for a branded
prescription then the prescription is filled with the
generic medicine. Counter-detailing informs physicians
of their prescribing options within a therapeutic cate-
gory, including generic as well as branded products.
This can be beneficial, since in some cases the same
efficacy can be obtained with a generic product as
would be expected from a more expensive branded
alternative. Currently, the physician’s own experience
and study limit knowledge of generic prescribing
options. As an example, physicians have over 90 
products in nine drug classes that they could prescribe
for hypertension. Most physicians would likely have
identified their own preferred product in each of the
nine classes, and some alternatives as combinations. 
It is not reasonable to assume that physicians can stay
informed on all their options. This is not to suggest
that physicians do not work to stay informed, but the
sheer volume of information that exists about the over
6,000 pharmaceutical products is beyond any one
person to manage. As noted earlier here, the pharma-
ceutical companies have found that it has been cost-
effective to provide a 250% increase in the number 
of people telling physicians about new branded
prescribing options. Similarly, counter-detailing could
be cost-effective if a state could have a policy whereby
physicians would be informed about the alternative
generic prescribing options that exist. Indeed Merck-
Medco, one of the country’s largest pharmaceutical
benefits managers (PBMs), has completed a three-year
trial for counter-detailing and has decided to continue
the program. (Merck-Medco, now known as Medco
Health Solutions, is a subsidiary of the giant Merck
pharmaceutical company.)  
Another market-based policy approach would
require pharmaceutical companies to release figures on
their marketing costs. The hope is that by increasing
public awareness of marketing practices, companies 
will be pressured to reduce their increase in marketing
costs, thereby limiting their need to increase prices. This
strategy seems unlikely to lead to actual cost reduction.
However, obtaining information on marketing costs
would allow states and consumer groups to more 
effectively counteract industry reports of the relative
weighting of marketing versus research and development
costs. This has been a central issue in many debates
regarding pharmaceutical costs at the state and the
federal level, and the lack of consensus on marketing
costs undermines many efforts to accurately assess the
pharmaceutical industry’s claims about investment.
Vermont’s Approach
Probably the most comprehensive and novel single
piece of legislation any state has enacted is Vermont
Act 127 in 2002.4 Because of its wide-ranging
approach, it is worthwhile to examine Vermont’s recent
legislation in some detail. A summary of the bill is
provided in Table 4. Act 127 includes two methods 
to try to provide direct cost reductions for consumers:
pursuing a bulk purchasing strategy and enacting a
program based on the Maine Rx program. However,
the novel ideas are the market-based reforms intended
to encourage cost reduction. The key specific plans
include developing a preferred drug list for state-reim-
bursed prescriptions, counter-detailing, and marketing
disclosure. These ideas offer new directions for state
legislation to go.
The initial report on the results of the new
Vermont legislation issued by the Department of
Prevention, Assistance, Transition and Health Access
…by creating a more competitive
marketplace, costs can be decreased 
for consumers and the states.
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(PATH) in 2002 provides some support for the develop-
ment of the preferred drug list, combined with an
education program that is intended to grow into full
counter-detailing.5 Overall, the report notes that all
programs utilized to control costs had resulted in
savings of $6.7 million after allowing for the costs 
(~$2 million) of running the programs. Specifically, the
preferred drug list and education effort had focused on
three specific drug categories: gastric acid reducers, anti-
inflammatories, and narcotic analgesics. From these three
categories, PATH reported a pharmacy cost decrease 
of $3.8 million, comparing 2002 to 2001. The vast
majority of these savings, over $3.1 million, was from
the gastric acid reducers. The fact that one category 
was responsible for such a large savings raises a question
regarding the broad applicability of this strategy. One
question that should have been addressed was the
impact of one specific product, Prilosec, becoming 
available as a generic in December 2002. Despite this
question, a substantial savings was achieved merely by
clearly defining preferred products, based on costs and
efficacy, and then communicating the list of preferred
products to physicians and pharmacists. 
WHAT CAN MAINE DO?
Maine is in a difficult position in its attempt toincrease prescription drug access in the midst 
of a budget crisis. New state-funded programs are
unlikely to be created, and current programs relying 
on state funds are likely to be constrained. As a further
challenge, a federal court ruling in December 2002
TABLE 4: Act 127, Pharmacy Best Practices and Cost-Control Program for Vermont
PLAN                                     METHOD OF DELIVERY
The state will join a broad coalition of states to form a large purchasing group 
for pharmaceutical products.
The act creates an effort to increase access and lower costs directly, utilizing four 
of the strategies noted above.These include designing a prescription drug discount
(similar to Maine Rx but distinct), coordinating utilization of pharmaceutical assistance
programs from drug manufacturers, negotiating supplemental rebates from manufac-
turers based on reference pricing, and pursuing a bulk purchasing program.
The act requires the state to develop a preferred drug list based on efficacy and 
cost effectiveness, as decided by the state physician advisory board.
The state, through the Department of Prevention,Assistance,Transition, and Health
Access (PATH), will begin creating a program to educate about the preferred drug 
lists that have been developed and will ultimately begin an effort to provide counter-
detailing.A counter-detailing program would be designed to provide information and
education on the therapeutic and cost-effective utilization of prescription drugs to
physicians, pharmacists and other health care professionals authorized to prescribe 
and dispense prescription drugs.
The act requires all pharmaceutical companies to file an annual disclosure of gifts 
and cash payments to doctors.The companies shall disclose to the Vermont board 
of pharmacy the value, nature and purpose of any gift, fee, payment, subsidy or other
economic benefit provided in connection with detailing, promotional or other
marketing activities by the company, directly or through its pharmaceutical marketers,
to any physician, hospital, nursing home, pharmacist, health benefit plan administrator
or any other person in Vermont authorized to prescribe, dispense, or purchase
prescription drugs in the state. Disclosure shall be made on a form and in a manner
prescribed by the board. Initial disclosure shall be made on or before January 1, 2004
for the 12-month period ending June 30, 2003.
1.Aggregate purchasing plan
2. Maine Rx-based plan 
3. Preferred drug list
4. Counter-detailing and
physician education
5. Required marketing
disclosure
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revoked the Medicaid waiver for Healthy Maine, the
state’s Medicaid prescription drug program. Healthy
Maine, a distinct program from the Maine Rx program,
provided a prescription drug benefit to Medicaid recipi-
ents. The federal government revoked the waiver on
procedural grounds, claiming that Maine failed to
secure the necessary signature from the secretary of
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
The program has been placed on hold, meaning that
over 100,000 people who had benefited from reduced
costs for prescription drug products via Healthy Maine
lost the savings and potentially the access to more
affordable prescription drugs. Currently, Maine has
revamped efforts to secure the necessary signature from
Secretary Tommy Thompson, without success to date. 
While Maine has been a leader in direct cost-
reduction efforts, particularly with the Maine Rx
program, it is now beginning to consider legislation
similar to the more market-based reforms the Vermont
Legislature passed in 2002. A number of specific bills
dealing with prescription drug issues have been intro-
duced in the 121st legislature’s regular session and
several have passed. These bills focus on three areas:
• Finding new avenues to directly reduce costs
as a means to increase access;
• Regulating pharmacy benefit managers
(PBMs); 
• Requiring pharmaceutical companies to
disclose marketing costs and to abide by their
ethical guidelines for marketing their products
to physicians. 
The direct cost-reduction bills are variants 
on strategies discussed earlier. The pharmaceutical
marketing disclosure bills are similar to the legislation
enacted in Vermont. The PBM-focused legislation,
which includes two distinct bills, is a new strategy that
has not been enacted to date. 
The PBM effort makes some sense, based on the
flow of cash illustrated in Figure 2. The flow from
pharmaceutical companies to PBMs would appear to 
be an avenue that could be tapped to offer a potentially
low-cost method to try to manage consumer costs,
primarily through passing on to consumers a greater
share of the rebate money received by PBMs. 
A recent New York Times article stated that Merck-
Medco, one of the nation’s largest PBMs, has acknowl-
edged receiving over $3.5 billion in rebates over three
years (Freudenheim 2003). An unknown percentage 
of these rebates is passed on to customers. On the face
of it, that seems like a substantial amount of money
that should reasonably benefit consumers as opposed 
to the PBM. 
One bill before the Maine Legislature would seek
to make public the rebates that PBMs receive and
ensure that the discounts go to consumers in the form
of reduced prices. There are two key difficulties in
implementing this kind of legislation: (1) ascertaining
the actual price of a product, and (2) understanding
how rebates are currently divided, which would need
to be known before enacting the legislation. 
The issue of understanding price is very similar 
to the problem discussed earlier regarding the charges
companies make to Medicare/Medicaid based on their
actual sales prices, as opposed to using the average
wholesale price (AWP) when calculating these charges.
Most PBMs would have a difficult time identifying the
actual price for any products, since rebates and discounts
change over time based on sales or other information. 
Rebates could be difficult to legislate because 
they are not fully understood. One common rebate 
is a volume rebate, where a manufacturer will provide 
a rebate of a certain percent dependent on sales over a
specific quarter. The percentage of the rebate increases
as various sales thresholds are reached. Thus, the higher
the sales are, the higher the rebate. This can be seen 
as an incentive for a PBM to encourage the use of a
specific product, based on the rebate the PBM receives.
At the same time, the PBM will reduce the cost of that
product to pharmacies based on an estimate of the
rebate they expect. Typically, that product would be 
the least-expensive brand alternative for the particular
diagnosis involved. In the current system, the consumer
is already a beneficiary of the PBM’s ability to nego-
tiate the rebate. A reasonable question remains about
the scale of the consumer’s benefit compared to 
the PBM’s benefit based on the rebate. Legislation
requiring the reporting of rebates might make a more
reasonable first step, prior to legislating the specific
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level of the rebate that the PBM must pass on to
consumers. The other PBM-focused legislation seems
to face similar challenges. Legislation requiring non-
profit PBMs to be considered for state contracts inher-
ently suggests that the marketplace is not providing 
the best benefit to customers, including the state. Again,
increased transparency in how PBMs operate might
offer a simpler step for the legislature to explore. 
CONCLUSION
The frustration that both consumers and state legis-latures are experiencing regarding the costs of
pharmaceutical products is not likely to be solved in
the immediate future by any of the ideas discussed
here. Solutions, if they are to be found, need to be
long-term ones. The advantage of the direct cost-
reduction strategies that states have been employing,
such as Maine Rx, is that the potential savings are
immediate and readily apparent. The difficulty in 
actually implementing those programs, either because
of legal delays or because of states’ inability to afford
them, has limited the benefit of these potential
programs. Several of the market-based reforms being
explored offer possible long-term solutions, but are
unlikely to provide dramatic, immediate cost relief.
Therefore, a combination of policies aimed at direct
cost reduction and market-based reforms seem to
provide the best opportunity to address both short- 
and long-term concerns over prescription drug costs
and access. 
The challenge that the United States is trying to
solve is how we as a country can support the growth 
of the pharmaceutical industry while not allowing this
one sector of the economy to grow out of proportion,
to the detriment to the overall economy and health 
care of American consumers. As noted earlier, the
United States is one of the only countries in the world
that does not have some kind of price restrictions 
on pharmaceuticals. In choosing this course of action,
we have so far been willing to take the risks involved
in jeopardizing consumer access to pharmaceutical
products. To make this a reasonable trade, it seems
incumbent that the federal government provide for 
a more competitive marketplace as a way to provide
some market-based controls on prices. This trade-off
is easier to consider at the federal level as opposed to
the state level, since the federal government is a benefi-
ciary of the pharmaceutical industry and can try to
balance industry growth with the needs of consumers
and health care payers. However, this issue is hardly
addressed in any of the discussion of prescription drug
legislation. Instead, consumer demand for immediate
decreases in prices is met by intensive lobbying from
the pharmaceutical industry, which is trying to limit
changes in the regulatory framework for its products. 
It seems apparent that the U.S. Congress and the execu-
tive branch of the federal government are unlikely to
be able to reach any consensus to address the broad
issue in the near future. Development of a federal
Medicare prescription drug benefit, which does seem
possible, would help to address some of the immediate
access issues in individual states, but that will not 
likely impact the upward trend in pharmaceutical costs.
States are left on their own to try and develop
market-based reforms that facilitate development of a
more competitive, transparent pharmaceutical industry.
In this situation, strategies that focus on increasing
knowledge for consumers, physicians, and legislators 
all seem as though they provide a logical first step.
Legislation that limits an industry and market that are
not clearly understood is unlikely to be effective and
could easily be counter-productive.  
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ENDNOTES
1.A detailed listing and discussion of many of the state-
level plans proposed and/or enacted to increase
access and reduce costs can be found at the National
Conference of State Legislatures Web site. I have
drawn upon some of that information here. See:
www.ncsl.org/programs/health/drugaid.htm and
www.ncsl.org/programs/health/rxads.htm
2.The summary in Table 3 is provided by the Maine
Citizen Leadership Fund from its Maine Rx Web site:
www.rxmaine.com/home/index.cfm
3. Information listed on the National Conference of State
Legislatures Web site, combined with information
from Maine legislators about bills being introduced in
this legislative session, identify some of the new policy
strategies discussed in the section which follows.
4. See the Vermont State Legislature’s Web site:
www.leg.state.vt.us
5.The report can be found at
www.path.state.vt.us/districts/ovha/ovha5.htm
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